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Slow agricultural development has restrained economic growth and poverty 
alleviation in Cambodia. The country’s volatile history has left a legacy of weak 
tenure security and large areas of underutilized land. This study estimates the impact 
of access to land on poverty in a logistic regression framework using household 
survey data. Increased access to land is shown to significantly lower the risk of 
household poverty. Tenure security, land improvements and irrigation strengthens this 
effect. Simulations of the potential impact of a land reform package predicts a 16 
percentage points fall in poverty incidence among landowning rural households and a 
30-point fall when targeting the landless. The analysis suggests that improved tenure 
security should be at the top of the policy agenda. Given political and economic 
constraints, implementation of reforms remains a key challenge.  
JEL Codes: I32, O12, O53, Q12 and Q15.  
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Reform.  
                                                 
* The authors would like to acknowledge generous support from UNDP Cambodia. Chanto Sisowath, 
Luyna Ung and Vanak Khan at the Supreme National Economic Council, The Royal Government of 
Cambodia provided excellent research assistance. The article benefited from comments from 
participants at the Cambodia Economic Forum, Phnom Penh 9 May 2007.  
† Corresponding author Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, 
Sweden, Telephone +46-8 736 9342, E-mail: anders.engvall@hhs.se  
 2I. Introduction and Background  
The Cambodian Millennium Development Goals sets ambitious future development 
targets for the country, including eradication of extreme poverty and cutting in half 
the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015 (Kingdom of Cambodia, 
2003). The ambitious goals for the future should be seen against a decade of strong 
progress in improving livelihoods and alleviating widespread poverty. Figure 1 shows 
an impressive decline in poverty rates of about ten percentage points during the past 
decade. The improvement in human development has been faster in the more 
prosperous parts of the country, as indicated by the marked fall in poverty in urban 
areas. In urban Phnom Penh, poverty incidence has been reduced to single-digit 
figures. Thus, a decade of progress in improving human development has also led to 
an increased concentration of underdevelopment to rural areas, and in 2004 more than 
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Source: CSES, 2004.  
Figure 1: Poverty Headcount, 1993/4 to 2004. 
Behind the increase in living standards lies a period of strong economic growth in 
Cambodia. For the past ten years, the average yearly growth rate has been 
approximately 6 percent. This growth has been largely driven by garment 
manufacturing and tourism, while agricultural growth has been very modest (see 
Figure 2). The urban growth bias explains the poverty trends noted above. If this 
uneven development persists, Cambodia risk mimicking the example of some other 
developing countries, such as neighboring Thailand, where growth has been overtly 
biased towards urban areas, leaving substantial pockets of poverty in the countryside 
(NESDB and World Bank, 2005). With about 80 percent of the labor force in 
agriculture, and about 60 percent of the total labor force in subsistence farming, rural 
development remains at the center of the current policy agenda (Ramamurthy et.al., 
2001). To achieve the ambitious Cambodian development goals, it will be essential to 
turn agriculture into a driver of economic growth and spread human development to 


































Source: National Institute of Statistics, 2006.  
Figure 2: GDP Growth by Sector, 1994-2004 at Constant Prices.  
During this decade of strong growth in the urban economy, Cambodia has witnessed a 
rapid structural transformation. In the mid-1990s the garment sector was of negligible 
size and agriculture and forestry accounted for almost half of the Cambodian 
economy (Figure 3). Ten years later, the GDP share of garments and other 
manufacturing industry is of the same size as agriculture. This shows both the 
phenomenal performance of the garment sector, but also the stagnation of the rural 
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Figure 3: GDP Shares by Sector 1994.  
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Figure 4: GDP Shares by Sector 2004.  
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2006).  
Compared to neighboring countries, Cambodia emerges as an average performer, 
lagging behind developments in China and Vietnam, but staying clearly ahead of 
Myanmar (Burma), the regional underperformer. At least part of the explanation for 
the Cambodian inability to achieve growth figures on par with the most successful 
economies in the region can be found in the limited contribution from the rural sector 
to overall growth. To keep up with China and Vietnam, the country must draw on 
 4sources of growth other than just garments and tourism. In particular, the agricultural 
sector where a large part of the labor force still remains, must be increasingly 
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Source: Engvall, Magnoli and Richter, 2005.  
Figure 5: GNI Per Capita Greater Mekong Region, 1992-2004 (US Dollar).  
There are ample opportunities for the rural economy to increase its contributions to 
economic growth and human development improvements (EIC, 2006). Since 
substantial areas of land are unused or underutilized, there is a potential for increasing 
access to productive land for rural households. Increased security of property rights to 
land could also strengthen the incentives for investments in land improvement and 
new technologies. Furthermore, secure property rights could help farmers get access 
to credits, which is often a prerequisite for engaging in land improvement and 
participating in technical progress. Taken together, these and other measures would 
contribute to raising the crop yields that are currently among the lowest in the region. 
To promote agricultural growth, the Government of Cambodia has therefore launched 
several ambitious reform initiatives, with support from the international donor 
community (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2002).  
The objective of this study is to analyze the potential impact of various land reform 
initiatives on human development and poverty, to identify some of the challenges 
regarding the implementation of the reforms, and to discuss reform design in order to 
maximize the human development impact of agricultural reforms. To reach this 
objective, the report proceeds as follows: the next section describes general issues 
related to land, as well as the status of land, landlessness, and land disputes in 
Cambodia. Then the role of land as a determinant of human development is discussed, 
and the potential impact of land reform is identified in a quantitative analysis. Some 
key challenges for implementation are also highlighted. A final section concludes and 
discusses policy implications.  
 5II. Land Property Rights in Cambodia  
A precondition for social and economic development in any society is its ability to 
define and enforce property rights. Property rights to land are particularly critical. 
Economic growth, the development of markets, and increased population density tend 
to raise the value of land, which can lead to either the development of institutions that 
define and protect property right or costly conflicts over land rights (World Bank, 
2003). The necessary institutions are unlikely to develop spontaneously, leaving an 
important role for the state. There are at least three strong motives for public 
involvement in the establishment and protection of property rights to land (World 
Bank, 2003):  
o  Lower need for individuals to spend resources in order to establish and protect 
their property rights.  
o  The cost and equity advantages normally associated with a systematic 
approach (i.e. “fairness”). 
o  The network effects resulting from consistent availability of information 
across administrative units.  
 
The benefits from appropriate interventions to strengthen property rights and tenure 
security can be significant, both in terms of equity and reduced expenditure on 
defensive activities and in terms of economic growth, as a result of improved access 
to credits and higher investments among the land holders. However, to increase the 
security of property rights, legal and institutional issues need to be handled together 
with the broader social and economic environment within which land rights are 
embedded. On the legal side, the definition of property rights to land and the way in 
which people can acquire and transfer such rights must be clear and equitable, 
consistent with traditions and practices, and defined over sufficiently long periods of 
time. The risk of losing the rights to discretionary bureaucratic behavior must be 
minimized. On the institutional side, the procedures need to be simple, transparent, 
and accessible, and the services should be provided effectively and at low cost.  
Cambodia has gone through dramatic political changes during the past four decades, 
and each new government has introduced its own system for the use and ownership of 
land – these changes have created both confusion and conflict. The legal and 
institutional framework set up by the French colonial administration was completely 
destroyed when the Khmer Rouge took control of the country in 1975. They rejected 
private ownership of land, and instituted a comprehensive program for the 
resettlement of people, to break up the existing fabric of society. After the Khmer 
Rouge regime, under the People’s Republic of Cambodia (1979-1989), land remained 
under collective ownership and was used according to the socialist ideology of the 
regime.  
Soon after the departure of the Vietnamese in early 1989, it became clear that 
Cambodia needed a new national constitution, including a land reform and a new land 
law, to recognize private property and to mark the shift from socialism to a market 
economy. Shortly before the adoption of the Constitution establishing the State of 
Cambodia (1989-1993), Sub-Decree No. 25 was issued. This act, along with the 
passage of a complementary land management policy later in the year, led to the 
redistribution of collectively owned land to the population and the establishment of 
private land rights. The land rights were only available to Khmer citizens who had 
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promulgation of the market oriented policies. The reform recognized ownership rights 
to residential land-plots not bigger than 2 000 square meters, possession rights for 
cultivated land-plots of less than 5 hectares, and concession rights for plantation land-
plots larger than 5 hectares. The ownership rights from the earlier regimes were not 
recognized in the land allocation process: instead, the redistribution was based on a 
formula including household size and other household characteristics. The reason was 
that there were no documents left to prove formal land ownership from the colonial 
period, at the same time as claims based on historical or traditional land ownership 
rights were considered too vague or imprecise. One consequence was that the nominal 
distribution of land after the reforms in 1989 was remarkably egalitarian.  
The reforms also attempted to create a land use and possession registration program 
by establishing a Department of Land Titles. However, the Department was 
overwhelmed by the receipt of 4.5 million applications for titles over the course of 
two years and quickly became permanently backlogged. Most of the land holdings 
established through the 1989 land redistribution program are therefore not properly 
documented. Three years later the National Assembly passed the 1992 Land Law. 
This act formally completed the process of land reform that had begun with Sub-
Decree No. 25. The Land Law was very similar to previous Cambodian Civil Codes, 
recognizing succession, will, sale, gift, and possession as the processes by which 
ownership could be transferred. To acquire ownership through possession, the 
possessor of the land had to a) be in possession of the land for at least five years, b) 
submit a written application to the local authorities and c) regularly pay taxes (State of 
Cambodia 1992, Article 65).  
With the departure of UNTAC in 1993, the National Assembly passed a new 
constitution establishing the Kingdom of Cambodia, finally returning full control of 
the country to its own people. The constitution reasserted the right of individuals to 
own land but limited it to Cambodian citizens. However, it soon became clear that the 
1992 Land Law had significant weaknesses (Williams, 1999). In particular, the 
possibility to claim ownership solely on the basis of possession, coupled with the lack 
of documentation of the ownership and possession rights established through the 1989 
land reforms and the 1992 Land Law, set the stage for land grabbing and power 
abuses. As the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia, a massive land grab began, 
especially in Phnom Penh. Some officials began to act as though State property and 
vacant private property (or property that could be rendered vacant by the use of force) 
was theirs to occupy, “own” and therefore sell. The rushed passage of the 1992 Land 
Law to some extent legitimized these expropriations. It has even been claimed that the 
1992 law became a “get rich quick” manual for the upwardly mobile who knew how 
to satisfy the formal registration requirements: few rural families had managed to 
secure the necessary documentation to prove their land ownership rights. 
Over the course of the next decade numerous drafts for a new land law were put forth. 
A new law was finally passed in August 2001, addressing many of the weaknesses of 
the 1992 legislation. For instance, in the new law temporary possession is removed as 
a means of acquiring land. Only those people who were already in legal possession of 
a plot of unoccupied land at the time of passage were allowed to complete the 5-year 
period of occupation required to become legal owner (Kingdom of Cambodia 2001, 
Article 31). No-one who attempts to acquire land by temporarily possessing a plot 
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taken possession of their land before the law was enacted, the part of the 1992 law 
that required a written application in order for a household to secure legal ownership 
was removed (State of Cambodia 1992, Article 42).  
To make up for the removal of temporary possession as an avenue to ownership, the 
new law creates the possibility to establish social concessions. While the government 
granted large-scale economic concessions to large firms in the 1990s, the social 
concessions under the new law allow landless people to apply for a piece of land to be 
used for residence or subsistence farming free of charge (Kingdom of Cambodia 
2001, Article 51). The new law also provides for the implementation of a nationwide 
land titling system, including a simpler land registration system that can be 
implemented at the village level. Thanks to these adjustments, there is consensus that 
the formal legal law is now sufficient to handle most of the challenges related to the 
land market. The 2001 Land Law provides legal protection to establish the security of 
land tenure. It provides a fundamental basis for the reduction of land disputes, and 
facilitates land management by clarifying the ownership regime for land and creating 
protection for state property. 
For effective implementation of the Land Law a number of sub-decrees and 
regulations in the area of land management are required. These include e.g. sub-
decrees to ensure a fair and just resolution of land disputes, to register land ownership, 
and to manage social land concessions. The process of setting up this supporting 
legislation has been underway since 2001, and some important advances have been 
made. For instance, to ease the pressure on the overburdened and inefficient judicial 
system, a Cadastral Commission was established in 2002 to resolve land disputes 
outside the formal legal system. Yet, the promulgation of other necessary sub-decrees 
and regulations has been slow because of the limited resources available for 
legislative drafting and training in the relevant ministries and the judiciary. The legal 
and institutional framework in this area is therefore still weak, and the existing laws 
are not implemented in a fully satisfactory manner. For example, the Cambodia Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and World Bank (2005) has called 
attention to the need for more transparency in the allocation of economic land 
concessions, as well as stricter rules for how concessions are managed. There are 
continuous complaints that the land titling process is slow and only a minority of 
Cambodian households has formally registered their land ownership. The Cadastral 
Commission has also been criticized on grounds that it is subject to similar problems 
that motivated the transfer of land disputes from the regular court system.  
Landlessness and Land Disputes  
Since Cambodia is still a predominantly agrarian society, with over 70 percent of the 
population engaged in agriculture and subsistence consumption absorbing nearly two-
thirds of agricultural output, it is obvious that access to land is a crucial determinant 
of human development. To survive, most rural families need access to farm land. To 
escape poverty, they need enough land to feed their families and property rights that 
are secure enough to motivate long-term investments in land improvements and 
technical progress. However, many rural households in Cambodia suffer either from 
landlessness or near landlessness, or lack formal property rights to the land they live 
on. Consequently, poverty is widespread in Cambodia’s rural areas, and agricultural 
productivity growth is lower than in most other parts of East Asia. Land conflict is 
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both the formal court system and the NGOs monitoring the land sector report an 
increase in land disputes since the late 1990s. A likely consequence of the many 
disputes is that landlessness or near landlessness is also on the rise. This, in turn, 
constrains rural development (Ramamurthy et.al., 2001).  
Involuntary landlessness is one of the main causes of poverty and weak human 
development in Cambodia, and although it is considered an increasingly severe 
problem, there are no reliable national data on the number of landless people in the 
country. It is therefore hard to determine the precise causes of the increase in 
landlessness. Economic factors provide a part of the explanation; as increased land 
values induce households to sell their land and focus on alternative, non-farm 
activities. Moreover, a stronger economy improves the possibilities to find non-farm 
employment. This can be characterized as voluntary landlessness, and is probably a 
desirable outcome of economic growth and development; the role of agriculture as a 
major source of income will decrease over time.  
However, involuntary landlessness is more problematic, and it is also likely to be an 
increasing problem. Demographics clearly play an important role. With a population 
that has grown from around 8 million in the late 1980s to 14 million today, it obvious 
that land has become an increasingly scarce resource. Younger families are often in a 
weak position in the land market; there is little unused land, land prices are high, and 
the parents’ land is often too small to offer a reasonable livelihood for all their 
children. Another problem is related to the lack of savings and access to credits 
among poor households. Vulnerable households are subject to shocks; crop failures, 
illness among household members, and livestock mortality are major threats causing 
unexpected economic stress. These can have catastrophic consequences for the 
household. Since most poor rural families have limited access to credits, repeated 
shocks may eventually result in distress sales of land and landlessness.  
Another cause of landlessness is weak legal protection for land ownership. Few poor 
rural households have completed the registration procedures that are necessary to 
prove their property rights, and they are therefore vulnerable to land grabbing and 
forced evictions. In addition, economic land concessions restrict the local 
communities’ access to natural resources, such as fishing and hunting grounds, 
seriously damaging their income earning possibilities. In addition, there is a large 
proportion of households that can be characterized as nearly landless, with 0.5 
hectares of land or less: in some provinces, this group accounts for one-fourth of the 
rural population (see e.g. Sophal & Acharya, 2002).  
There are no reliable data on the exact number of land disputes. Many disputes never 
reach the courts, either because they are settled by local authorities or the Cadastral 
Commission, or because the families involved in the disputes lack the knowledge and 
resources to take their complaints to court. With the private costs for a court case 
reaching several hundred dollars, poor families are often unable to afford the process 
even if they borrow money or sell assets. Because of the weak institutional framework 
for land dispute resolution, it is also risky for individual families to engage in a formal 
complaint. In the absence of official data on land disputes, it is necessary to rely on 
information from NGOs to gauge the extent and character of land conflict in 
Cambodia. For instance, Oxfam GB has collected a data set covering over 1,500 
dispute cases in 23 provinces/municipalities: in about half of these cases, Oxfam has 
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information is based on media and complaints. Although the total number of cases in 
the data set is not very large, it is clear that land conflict affects many people. Taken 
together, the cases affected over 6 percent of all families in Cambodia and involved 
about 2 percent of the country’s total land area.  
Table 1: Land Dispute Monitoring Networks.  
Level Activity Active NGOs
National  Organize meetings 
Provide legal consultation
Advocate at national level
Press conferences and press statements
Provide support for the provincial/municipal level organizations
Act as assistant or defenders of the victims
Follow up land disputes from provincial/municipal level
Provincial/ Municipal  Organize meetings,  
Provide legal consultation 
Advocate at provincial/municipal levels
Maintain networks among civil society organizations
Research and investigate disputes
Submit cases to Cadastral Commission
Organize the meetings between NGOs and Cadastral Commission
Provide support to local mechanisms
Publish information
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Source: Oxfam UK, 2005.  
Judging from the Oxfam data, disputes are geographically concentrated, as four 
provinces accounted for over half of the disputes: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, 
Kampong Cham, and Kampong Speu. The great majority of the victims were farmers, 
with indigenous people and refugees accounting for less than one-fifth of the cases. 
Unsurprisingly, almost 70 percent of the cases involved farmland or plantation land, 
with land for construction accounting for most of the remaining cases. In most cases, 
the victims had occupied the disputed land plots for a long time. Nearly half of the 
families affected by the disputes claimed that they had acquired their land before 
1990: on average, the victims had occupied their land for about 16 years. The 
opponents in the disputes were mainly local, provincial, or national authorities (39 
percent of cases), armed forces (30 percent), and wealthy elites (16 percent). Only 3 
percent of cases involved companies. Nearly two-thirds of the cases were complaints 
about power violations or use of violence against the families using the land: the 
typical conflicts involved land grabbing and allocation of allegedly unused land for 
economic concessions and development projects. Most of the victims (70 percent) had 
no land ownership documents to prove their claims to the land. Interestingly, few of 
their opponents (in less than 10 percent of the cases) could support their claims to the 
land with formal land ownership titles. 
The cases in the Oxfam data set also illustrate the resolution mechanisms for land 
conflicts. Of the 797 cases documented through interviews, two-thirds went through 
the Cadastral Commission, 6 percent were handled by the commune council, and 27 
percent ended up in courts. Less than 40 percent of the cases had been resolved by 
2005, about 20 percent were still under investigation by the authorities, and the 
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conclusion. Many of these cases had been given up by the victims, who had been 
forced to leave their land.  
Due to uneven bargaining power, which leaves most poor rural families unable to 
defend their property rights on their own, a large number of NGOs have become 
engaged in land issues. By supporting the most vulnerable population groups involved 
in land disputes and by pressuring authorities to implement existing laws in a fair 
manner, the NGO community hopes to balance the strong bargaining position of more 
privileged population groups. Table 1 identifies some of these NGOs and their 
activities at different levels of the land dispute monitoring networks.  
Patterns of Land Use and Ownership  
Cambodia began to privatize land in 1989, after the Vietnamese retreat from the 
country, and it is widely believed that the distribution of land established in 
connection with the privatization was fair (Sovannarith et.al., 2001). Household with 
agriculture as their main occupation received land according to household size and 
other household characteristics. However, since that time, there have been significant 
socio-economic changes (refugee repatriation, urbanization, economics growth, and 







Forests Agriculture, Wet Rice  Agriculture, Other
Wetlands Wood and Grasslands Settlements
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Figure 6: Land Cover.  
The country’s total land area of 18.1 million hectares is divided among several land 
use categories, as shown in Figure 6. Some 23 percent of the total land area is used for 
agriculture, but less than 20 percent are available for farming households. The low 
share of farm land is partly due to geographic conditions – all land is not suitable for 
agriculture – but also related to institutional factors. Large areas of land are outside 
the access of rural households. These are tied up in economic concessions or protected 
for environmental reasons. (In addition, there are some areas that are unusable due to 
unexploded ordinance and mines).  
Gender disparities in access to and control of productive assets as land often hinders 
women’s ability to participate in and take advantage of the opportunities afforded by 
 11development (World Bank, 2001). In many developing countries, titles to land are 
typically vested in men. Indeed, gender also influences land use and agricultural 
production in Cambodia. Female heads of households are more likely to work in 
agriculture than male heads of households and yet are also more likely to be landless 
or have smaller plots of land (UNIFEM et. al., 2004). Despite the important role 
women play in the agricultural sector, they also have considerably lower access to the 
resources and assets that would increase their potential to contribute to improved 
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Figure 7: Legal Categories of Land.  
The economic land concessions are areas set aside for large scale commercial 
plantations. They are motivated by the argument that the commercial use of land will 
generate larger returns than subsistence farming, at the same time as it creates 
employment opportunities for local communities. However, the experience to date of 
economic land concessions has been disappointing. Apart from the conflicts that have 
resulted when land concessions have caused deforestation, obstructed local 
communities’ access to natural resources, polluted rivers and water tables, and 
uprooted the natural habitats of local and indigenous communities, they have not been 
efficient in generating incomes and employment. There are only few cases where the 
investors have actually managed to reach the production targets indicated in the 
concession contracts. In addition, there are widespread complaints regarding the 
economic conditions offered to the investors. For example, the royalties for the 
economic concessions are calculated on the basis of production, and since most of the 
concession land (an estimated 838 000 hectares) has not been used for agriculture, 
little public revenue has been generated. Instead, many investors have focused on 
harvesting the existing forest resources and left the land areas idle once the trees were 
cut; others have held on to their concessions expecting an increase in the land value as 
the Cambodian economy grows. This has been possible largely because there has been 
no cost to the investor of leaving the land idle. 
This underutilized land is a potentially important resource when considering land 
reform and distribution of land to poor households. A substantial proportion of the 
land currently under economic land concessions could potentially be redistributed 
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concessions, protected areas and forest land is in reality degraded forests with a 
limited environmental value. Some of this degraded forest could be used for social 
land concessions. Based on various conversations with policy makers and experts, our 
estimate is that 15 percent of the land area could be targeted for land reform. This is 
made up of the 6 percent in economic land concessions and another 9 percent from 
degraded forest land. This is equivalent to 2.7 million hectares.  
Land reform can have different primary objectives. A common objective is to increase 
the amount of land available for target households. Another objective could be to 
provide stronger ownership rights for land already possessed by the households. In 
addition, there is a possibility of including complementary reforms aiming at 
increasing the productivity of land. In the present analysis, an effort is made to assess 
the potential impact of all of these types of reforms.  
Programs for improving access to land often rest on the assumption that land has a 
strong human development potential for beneficiaries. Yet, many studies have failed 
to find any large effects of increased access to land for rural households (McCulloch 
& Baulch, 2000; Lopez & Valdés, 2000). The reason is that the empirical literature 
has often ignored a number of important considerations when measuring the human 
development impact of access to land (Finan et.al., 2005). First, many studies use an 
unnecessarily narrow definition of human development, solely represented by 
monetary income or consumption. Second, the need for vital qualifying factors to 
ensure the full human development potential of land is often ignored. This relates both 
to the access to skills and physical capital, as well as outside markets and 
infrastructure. If these conditioning factors are constrained, the ability of households 
to reap full benefits from increased land endowments is limited.  
So far, we have argued that slow agricultural growth has limited the overall economic 
development in Cambodia and led to lagging human development in rural areas. 
Important obstacles to rural development can be found in the weak enforcement of 
ownership rights and large areas of under-utilized land. This indicates that there are 
possibilities to increase the contribution from agriculture to development through 
reforms aimed at improving tenure security and redistributing land. The following 
section analyzes the potential impact of these reforms as well as the challenges for 
implementation.  
 13III. Linking Land and Human Development  
This section studies the relationship between land and human development in a 
regression framework. In a first step, a logistic regression estimation is used to 
establish the impact of land and other household and environmental variables on 
household poverty. In essence, this can be considered as an analysis of the 
determinants of poverty in the rural areas of Cambodia. In a second step, the results 
from the initial analysis are used to simulate the expected impact of various land 
reform programs. Third, the challenge of implementing land reforms is analyzed. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, the methodology is briefly discussed.  
Method  
In the empirical development literature, it is common to analyze the determinants of 
poverty by relating measures of human development to various individual, household, 
and community characteristics in a multiple regression framework (Singh et. al., 
1986). This method allows the researcher to compare the significance and impact of 
various potential determinants of human development, identify sources of differences 
between population groups, and simulate the effects of various policy interventions. 
The overall methodology is not controversial, but there are a number of theoretical 
issues that deserve attention. These concern the choice of dependent and independent 
variables, the econometric specification, the estimation method, and the interpretation 
of the results.  
The first issue is the choice of human development measure or dependent variable. In 
principle, the quantitative analysis can be based on either of three alternative 
measures: consumption expenditure, income, or binary indicators of poverty. In this 
study, we are focusing on a binary measure of poverty. This indicates whether or not 
an individual belongs to a poor household, and it has the advantages of analytical 
clarity and straight-forward interpretation in reform simulations. The drawback is that 
it introduces sensitivity to the choice of poverty line. Income measures are more 
volatile and more sensitive to measurement errors, and will therefore not be used.  
Since the surveys used for our empirical analysis collect information at the household 
level and not the individual level, consumption totals and poverty are calculated on a 
household basis. It is possible to either treat the household as the unit whose human 
development is being analyzed or to use some rule to divide household consumption 
between its members. Using the individual as the unit of analysis is conceptually 
clearer, so this is the approach used here. There is a variety of methods for calculating 
individual consumption measures, involving needs-based adult equivalence scales 
(Deaton, 1997). However, none is completely satisfactory since they all require strong 
assumptions about the consumption needs of individuals and the distribution of 
consumption across household members. Even if such adjustments are made, it is still 
possible that the distribution of income within the household systematically differs 
from what is assumed. In light of these practical difficulties in compensating for 
differences in requirements between adults and dependents, a straight per capita 
normalization is used.  
A further theoretical issue is the choice of explanatory variables. In principle, the 
choice should be based on a model for human development determination. At a basic 
level, the outcome depends on the household’s access to resources – labor, capital, 
land, and technology – as well as the quality of these resources. In addition, human 
 14capital is an important input in the household’s production function. The environment 
in which the household or individual operates influences the outcome of the 
production process in many ways. The degree and nature of competition varies 
between locations, and affects both productivity and the prices in the local market 
place. Institutions and public policy influence incentives and investment decisions, 
and may vary between locations. Similarly, the availability and quality of public 
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Figure 8: Conceptual Model; Human Development Outcomes of Reforms.  
On the basis of these considerations, Figure 8 illustrates a conceptual model of human 
development. The household’s assets go into a production process where they are 
transformed into an output or a human development outcome. The efficiency of the 
production process is influenced by institutional and geographic factors, as well as the 
availability of infrastructure and public services. Reforms can target either the 
household’s endowment of productive resources, or the services and infrastructure 
determining the efficiency of the production process. In addition, land reforms might 
have an impact on institutions by affecting social and political power and stability.  
The model captures several human development effects of land. First, it is possible 
that access to land has a direct impact on human development outcomes through the 
production process. It may also be that the effects of land depend on the existence of 
formal ownership or tenure rights to land. It is important to distinguish between these 
two effects, since the policy prescriptions and prospects for change may be quite 
different. For instance, it is possible that access to land without protected ownership 
rights has a substantially smaller effect on human development than access to land 
with formal title: households without formal property rights have weaker incentives to 
invest in land improvement and other fixed assets with a long turn-over period. If this 
is the case, merely providing land may not be sufficient to reduce poverty, whereas 
titling and protection of property rights may have a large effect on investments and 
productivity. 
 15To statistically estimate the model outlined in Figure 8, we use an econometric 
specification based on the theory of agricultural household models (Bardhan and 
Udry, 1999; Singh et al., 1986). This yields an empirical model relating poverty or per 
capita consumption measures to a set of determinants as specified in equation (1) 
below.  
(1)  i i i i i i i D Z W V X Y ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1  
where Yi is the binary poverty measure for household i, the variables Xi, Vi, Wi, and Zi 
are vectors of independent variables capturing the household’s holdings of land and 
agricultural production factors, various household characteristics, and the households 
access to infrastructure and linkages, Di is a vector of province variables, α is a 
constant, β1 to β5 are the corresponding vectors of coefficients, and εi is a normally 
distributed random error term.  
This formulation is attractive since it has a relatively straightforward functional form 
while being consistent with established models for human development. The 
regression model permits inferences to be made about the direction and strength of the 
relationship between a set of independent variables and the dependent variable. Most 
variables used in the model are measured at the household level: the infrastructure and 
geographic variables are defined at the village and province level. 
Variables and Data  
Although theoretical concepts like poverty, capital, technology, and infrastructure 
may seem clear, there is a gap between theories and available empirical data. These 
concepts are typically difficult to operationalize and measure with accuracy. In many 
cases, it is therefore necessary to settle for proxy variables. Moreover, in the choice of 
explanatory variables, it is desirable to avoid highly correlated variables that would 
introduce identification problems. This is necessary to make it possible to distinguish 
the individual contribution from each factor. The choice is also limited to exogenous 
variables that are expected to influence household poverty without themselves being 
directly determined by economic status. This excludes some potentially interesting 
variables, such as ownership of assets that may be determined by current income.  
The primary data source for this study is CSES, the Cambodian Socio-Economic 
Survey 2004. The survey gathered information on 12 000 households from all 
provinces in Cambodia, but the relevant data set is limited to the rural households. 
The main dependent variable is a dummy equal to 0 if the household is poor, and 
equal to 1 if the household is non-poor. The poverty line used is defined by the World 
Bank (2006). The explanatory variables are intended to reflect the household’s 
holdings of land and other production factors, and control for various household 
characteristics and environmental variables, like access to infrastructure and public 
services.  
Table 2 provides a list of the variables used in the regression analysis. The variables 
measuring the household’s land holdings include the total land area to which the 
household has access, as well as three variables intended to capture the quality of 
land. The first variable for land quality measure the share of the landholdings to which 
the household has formal ownership title. This is based on self-reporting, which 
introduces some risk for errors: it is not always clear whether the household’s claim to 
 16formal ownership is undisputed. However, this should not be any major problem in 
the present context, since the household’s incentives to invest in land improvements 
and fixed assets are likely to depend on their own judgments rather than formal rules. 
Secondly, we include the share of irrigated and improved land as a more direct 
measure of land quality. A variable is also included to indicate whether the household 
has been involved in any land conflict. The expected effects of the first four variables 
are positive, whereas the land conflict variable is expected to have a negative 
coefficient. To control for the household’s agricultural production inputs, we use 
measures of livestock ownership, agricultural mechanization and fertilizer use. All 
three variables are expected to have a positive effect.  
Table 2: Variables.  
Variable Definition and Comment
Dependent Variables
Cons. Per Capita Real Per Capita Consumption Expenditure 
HH Poverty  1 if household is poor; 0 otherwise
Land
Land Area Log household land access
Share Titled Land  Share of household land that is owned and titled 
Share Irrigated Land Area Share of household land that is irrigated 
Share Improved Land Area Share of household land that is improved land  
Land Conflict 1 if household has experienced land conflict; 0 otherwise 
Agricultural Production Factors 
Livestock Conversion Units Log number livestock owned by household (Livestock To Tropical livestock 
Conversion Units) 
Agricultural Mechanisation  1 if household owns tractor, bulldozer or semi-tractor; 0 otherwise
Fertilizer Use
1 if household used chemical fertilizer during last planting season; 0 otherwise
Household Characteristics
Household Business  1 if household run a business; 0 otherwise
Head of Household Age  Age of head of household in years. 
Male Head of Household  1 if Male Head of Household; 0 if Female Head of Household
Adults Log number of adults in household
Dependency Ratio
Ratio of dependents, below 18 year and above 59, versus adults 18-59
Max Education Index  Index for highest educational attainment in Household 
Literate Female  1 if household has literate female adult; 0 otherwise
Infrastructure and Linkages 
Distance to All Weather Road  Log distance to all weather road 
Industrical or Commercial Enterprise 1 if industrial or commercial enterprise in village or less than 10km away; 0 
otherwise 
Electricity Access  1 if village has access to electricity; 0 otherwise
Primary School 1 if village has primary school, 0 otherwise 
Healthservice Access  1 if village has access to clinic, dedicated drug shop, communal health center, 
hospital, doctor, nurse or trained midwife; 0 otherwise
Province Variables
1 if household is located in province; 0 otherwise  
Since household income and consumption is shared among its members we need to 
account for household characteristics, such as household size and the share of 
working age adults relative to dependent children and elders. The two variables we 
use are number of adults in the household and the dependency ratio. The expected 
effect of the dependency ratio is negative, since dependents do not contribute directly 
to production. The expected effect for number of adults is more uncertain, since it 
depends on production technology and average household size. Although all adults 
can be expected to contribute positively to the household’s total production, there are 
often diminishing returns because of the fixed amount of land, so that each additional 
 17adult contributes less than the previous ones. This would generate a negative 
coefficient.  
The other variables in the household characteristics category are the existence of some 
type of household business, the age and gender of the household head (with a variable 
equal to one for male household heads), a measure of the highest educational 
attainment of any household member, and a variable for female literacy. General 
literacy is sometimes used in studies of other developing countries, but does not 
perform well in the Cambodian context, since almost all rural households have at least 
one literate household member. These variables are expected to have positive effects 
on human development and consumption capacity.  
To capture the effects of infrastructure and linkages, we include the distance to the 
nearest all weather road and four variables to capture access to non-farm employment 
and public services. These distinguish households located close to industrial or 
commercial enterprises, and households with access to electricity, primary schools, 
and health services. Our human development measure is expected to be negatively 
related to the distance to all weather roads, but positively affected by the other 
infrastructure and linkage variables.  
Table 3: Variable Mean Values.  




Land Area 1.11 N/A
Share Titled Land  0.37 N/A
Share Irrigated Land Area 0.27 N/A
Share Improved Land Area 0.07 N/A
Land Conflict 2% N/A
Agricultural Production Factors 
Livestock Conversion Units 1.49 0.30
Agricultural Mechanisation  3% N/A
Fertilizer Use 80% N/A
Household Characteristics
Household Business  39% N/A
Head of Household Age  44.8 43.7
Male Head of Household  79% 72%
Adults 2.51 2.16
Dependency Ratio 1.15 1.23
Max Education Index  6.33 5.28
Literate Female  91% 63%
Infrastructure and Linkages 
Distance to All Weather Road  2.96 3.14
Industrical or Commercial Enterprise 28% 36%
Electricity Access  22% 36%
Primary School 43% 49%
Healthservice Access  49% 53%   
Source: CSES, 2004.  
Table 3 presents average variable values for rural households with access to land and 
rural landless household. Households with businesses have been excluded from the 
landless category, as we are mainly interested in those landless households that 
remain solely active in the agricultural sector.  
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interesting patterns. In general, the landowning and landless households display some 
striking similarities, for example regarding access to infrastructure and linkages. One 
notable difference between the two categories of households is that landless 
households are more often headed by females and that their dependency ratios are 
higher. These characteristics reflect the gender bias discussed earlier and are 
presumably connected, since the dependency ratio will be higher if the husband is 
absent.  
Analysis  
The results for the logistic regression models are presented in Table 4. The tables 
report results for rural households with land and landless households deriving their 
main income from agriculture. A first observation is related to the signs of the 
coefficients. The construction of the poverty dummy means that independent variables 
with positive coefficients raise the likelihood that a household will be non-poor. It 
should be noted that all significant variables display the expected signs. This indicates 
that the variables included in the model do indeed influence household welfare as 
expected. The following paragraphs discuss the coefficient estimates in closer detail.  
Table 4: Logistic Regression, Rural Households With and Without Access to Land.  
Measure Coefficient z-value Sig. Coefficient z-value Sig.
Dependent Variable
Constant  -0.15 -0.40 0.35 0.68
Land
Land Area 0.08 3.28 *** N/A
Share Titled Land  0.22 3.69 *** N/A
Share Irrigated Land Area 0.15 2.27 ** N/A
Share Improved Land Area 0.54 4.26 ** N/A
Land Conflict -0.06 -0.32 N/A
Agricultural Production Factors 
Livestock Conversion Units 0.11 5.32 *** 0.08 1.36
Agricultural Mechanisation  0.42 2.89 *** N/A
Fertilizer Use 0.46 6.52 *** N/A
Household Characteristics
Household Business  0.62 9.77 *** N/A
Head of Household Age  0.60 6.27 *** 0.72 2.58 **
Male Head of Household  0.40 5.49 *** 0.42 2.11 ***
Adults -2.29 -25.27 *** -1.82 -7.27 ***
Dependency Ratio -1.13 -27.95 *** -1.03 -9.71 ***
Max Education Index  0.07 8.19 *** 0.06 2.85 **
Literate Female  0.53 7.91 *** 0.74 4.03 ***
Infrastructure and Linkages 
Distance to All Weather Road  -0.06 -1.82 * 0.29 3.47 **
Industrical or Commercial Enterp 0.10 1.39 0.29 1.60
Electricity Access  0.69 8.15 *** 0.38 1.88 *
Primary School 0.02 0.38 -0.10 -0.61
Healthservice Access  0.06 0.93 0.10 0.54
Province Variables
Observations 9460 969
Model Chi-Square 2400.25 *** 182.99 ***
Degrees of Freedom [42, 408] [12, 280]
Coefficients statistically significant at a 99% (***), 95% (**), and 90% (*) confidence levels.
HH Non-Poverty  HH Non-Poverty 
Rural with Land Rural Landless
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CSES, 2004.  
 19All of the land variables in Table 4 have the expected positive sign (even though the 
land conflict variable is not statistically significant). This suggests that the risk for 
household poverty is reduced with increased access to land, and in particular when 
this land is secured by a title. Land improvements and irrigation provides additional 
improvements in human development outcomes. All agricultural production factors 
also have the expected positive effects.  
The variables for household characteristics also record significant coefficients with 
expected signs. The strongest effects are recorded by the household composition 
variables. As expected, larger households and those with many dependents have a 
higher risk of poverty. Owning a household business has a strong positive effect on 
the likelihood that a household is non-poor, which provides strong support for policies 
focusing on diversification of rural activities. Furthermore, education matters, as both 
the education index and female literacy have positive effects. Households with male 
heads are less likely to be poor. Taken together with the strong positive impact of 
female literacy, this suggests that households with illiterate female heads are in a very 
vulnerable position. 
The results for the infrastructure variables are less significant. Distance to road and 
access to electricity have significant coefficients of expected signs (except the positive 
influence of increased distance to road among landless households). Overall, the 
results from Table 4 are well in accordance with the results from analyses of 
neighboring countries (Andersson et al., 2006).  
The results for landless households follow a similar pattern as those for households 
with access to land, with the peculiar exception of the distance to the road variable 
noted above. It is hard to rationalize this finding, but it does not change the overall 
conclusion, that the production process of landless agrarian households are 
determined by roughly the same set of factors as that of households with land. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that landless households targeted for land reform 
would be able to improve their human development outcomes and get a chance to 
escape poverty.  
Assessing the Impact of Land Reform  
A final step in the empirical analysis is a simulation of the effects of land reforms on 
human development and poverty. Four different reform scenarios with different 
combinations of land redistribution, land titling, and complementary reforms are 
explored. This can be thought of as a comparison between different potential policy 
interventions to improve the conditions for the rural poor, and a test of the economic 
significance of the results provided this far. The four reform scenarios are summarized 
in Box 1 below.  
All four scenarios are applied to households with access to land, while scenarios II, III 
and IV will be tested for the group of landless households. The simulations are based 
on coefficient estimates from a logistic regression similar to that presented in Table 4.  
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Box 1: Reform Scenarios.  
I.  Land Titling. In this scenario, all households are given formal title to 
all their current land, strengthening ownership rights. Other factors are 
held constant.  
II.  Land Allocation. In this reform scenario, all households are given 
access 5 hectares of land, holding other factors constant.  
III.  Land Allocation and Titling. In this  scenario, land allocation is 
combined with titling. Giving all households access to 5 hectares of 
titled land.  
IV.  Land Allocation and Complementary Reforms. In this scenario, 
household access to titled land is increased and complementary 
reforms providing electricity access to all households are undertaken.  
The simulations focusing on households with land are made by changing the variable 
values for land area and titled land to correspond with the assumptions in scenarios I-
IV. For the landless households, it is assumed that they will receive a return to land 
equal to that of a matched sample of similar households from the same geographic 
area. In scenario IV, we also set the variable for electricity to one, assuming that 
complementary investments are made to provide electrical access to all households. 
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Observed Value  Land Titling
Land Allocation Land Allocation and Titling
Land Allocation and Complimentary Reform 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CSES, 2004.  
Figure 9: Poverty Headcount under Reform Scenarios.  
The effects of the four reform scenarios on poverty rates of households with some 
initial access to land are displayed in Figure 9. In the base case, 31 percent of the 
households in this sample are classified as poor. Providing title to all their land would 
 21reduce the incidence of poverty to 23 percent, i.e. a reduction of 8 percentage points. 
This is a lower effect than what has been estimated in some other studies, although it 
should be pointed out that our methodology is not directly comparable to earlier 
studies. If all households were instead given additional land, so that their total land 
holdings would increase to a minimum of 5 hectares (with no change in the land 
holdings of families with more than 5 hectares), the reduction in the incidence of 
poverty would be roughly the same – about 5 percentage points. Although the effects 
on poverty rates from the two experiments are roughly similar, there is reason to 
emphasize the impact of land titling. It is probably less controversial than land reform, 
but it would have at least as strong an effect on the households that already have 
access to some agricultural land.  
If titling and land distribution are combined, as in scenario III, the joint effect is on 
par with only providing title, reducing the incidence of poverty to about 22 percent. 
This indicates that the additional effect of land redistribution is only marginal if 
ownership protection has already been secured. Finally, adding our rough proxy for 
complementary reform – electrification – there is a very substantial effect on poverty, 
reducing the poverty rate from 31 percent to 15 percent. Considering electrification as 
a proxy for infrastructure investment in general, this is an intuitively appealing result, 
suggesting that markets and public services are critically important for the long-term 
growth prospects of the Cambodian countryside.  
The simulations for landless poor households, as reported in Figure 9, are more 
complicated. In addition to adjustments to the land area, titled land, and electricity 
access variables as discussed above, it is necessary to take into account some of the 
differences in the characteristics between the landless and land holding households. In 
particular, we know that one of the responses to landlessness has been a stronger 
emphasis on income generating household businesses. We have therefore excluded 
household with a business from the analysis (just as we did in the logistic regression) 
to focus on landless agricultural household.  
Allocating land to these landless households gives a simulated effect of a 7 percentage 
point fall in poverty. Combining allocation of land with titling gives an additional 9 
percentage point fall in poverty; with investments in infrastructure the poverty rate is 
brought down to 5%, which is a fall with almost 29 percentage points. This indicates 
that there is a possibility to substantially improve the human development outcomes 
for agricultural landless households through a broad land reform program.  
 22IV. Implementing Land Reforms  
While it is clear that large human development benefits may be reaped from land 
reforms, it is also necessary to discuss how to achieve such reforms. This section 
highlights some of the key issues to be considered when developing and 
implementing land reform policies. The basis for this section is the view that there is 
no quick solution for the land related problems in Cambodia. Instead, the necessary 
reform agenda needs to be based on a long-term perspective with strengthened 
ownership rights as the main short-term priority.  
Building Support for Reform  
There are strong political motives for addressing the biased land ownership structure 
in Cambodia. In many countries, land reforms have contributed to mitigating social 
unrest and creating a foundation for increased political and social stability. There is 
no doubt that conflicts over land resources have contributed to political and social 
problems in Cambodia. To secure future political stability, it is essential that land 
related problems are resolved. Equitable and secure access to land can be viewed as 
part of a social contract, which creates a base for successful future economic, political 
and social development.  
Priorities, Sequencing, and Targeting  
Strengthened land ownership rights should be the main priority for policy makers. 
In the short run, this includes further land titling as well as more efficient legal 
protection for land owners. Only on a basis of secure land ownership can further steps 
in the land reform program be implemented. While far from a quick win strategy, 
increased tenure security is the first step to building stronger agricultural 
development, to be followed by efforts to increase the land holdings of target 
households and to strengthen their productive capacity. 
The unequal distribution of land ownership observed in Cambodia is to some extent 
the outcome of distortionary policies in the past; in particular, many of the current 
problems related to land ownership can be traced back to the Khmer Rouge era and 
the catastrophic effects of abolishing private property. It is unreasonable to expect 
markets alone to generate land redistribution at the rate that would be required to 
maximize human development outcomes (World Bank, 2003). This provides a 
justification for support to land reforms, both on grounds of productive efficiency and 
because of the wider social consequences of a severely unequal land distribution.  
The impact of land reforms is often reduced by a desire to award land plots large 
enough to enable beneficiaries to derive a livelihood from agriculture only. This may 
be an inefficient strategy as it neglects the diverse options and the scope for 
beneficiaries to rely on non-agricultural sources of income. It also ignores the 
restraints preventing beneficiaries from making full use of the land they receive due to 
a lack of complementary resources. A more efficient basis for a land reform program 
may be to support a dual-income approach. By encouraging beneficiaries to 
continue supplementary income opportunities while increasing agricultural incomes a 
maximum effect of land reforms may be derived. An additional benefit of this reform 
approach is that it enables households to diversify and reduce the vulnerability to 
shocks.  
 23Targeting of policies to vulnerable yet capable groups is important. Experience 
shows that giving access to land has been easier than securing the competitiveness of 
beneficiaries, and that the failure to address capabilities has rendered a number of 
reforms incomplete (Warriner, 1969). As a consequence, longer term issues related to 
securing the ability and competitiveness of reform beneficiaries must be addressed. 
The quantitative analysis supports the view that the rural land poor might be a more 
appropriate target group than those landless that has left the agricultural sector. This 
can also involve identifying geographic priorities through additional descriptive data 
on spatial patterns of land and population. The selected provincial statistics presented 
in Table 5 may give some indications for geographic targeting of land reforms in 
Cambodia. For example, the Tonle Sap region could be a suitable starting point for 
future efforts at land redistribution, as the region has large areas of land tied up in 
economic land concessions, and human development is lagging behind as indicated by 
the high poverty incidence and low access to water and health services.  


















Phnom Penh 1 002 000 2.7 4 24 000
Plains 31
Kampong Cham 1 747 000 2.5 12 670 27 16 000
Kampot 575 000 2.3 35 800 12 12 000
Kandal 1 186 000 3.3 - 29 13 000
Prey Veng 1 066 000 2.2 - 74 11 000
Svey Rieng  530 000 1.8 - 71 14 000
Takeo 882 000 2.6 - 21 12 000
Coast 17
Kep 34 000 2.5 - 12 7 000
Koh Kong 131 000 1.6 67 700 14 9 000
Sihanoukville 174 000 2.7 12 800 14 17 000
Tonle Sap 33
Banteay Meanchey 587 000 1.8 - 15 11 000
Battambang 949 000 2.2 8 000 19 11 000
Kampong Chhang 444 000 1.7 138 963 22 12 000
Kampong Thom 625 000 1.4 19 863 8 12 000
Pursat 385 000 1.9 179 065 7 10 000
Siem Reap 777 000 1.4 - 21 13 000
Plateau/Mountain 58
Kampong Speu 691 000 1.9 128 906 28 13 000
Kratie 285 000 2.9 - 25 9 000
Mondul Kiri 47 000 1.9 29 900 25 3 000
Oddar Meanchey 144 000 1.7 - 15 10 000
Pailin 54 000 2.8 - 19 11 000
Preah Vihear 142 000 1.9 - 25 10 000
Rattanak Kiri 124 000 2.1 31 380 25 6 000
Stung Treng 93 000 2.0 172 877 25 10 000
Source: Population: Commune Database 2004, Poverty: World Bank 2006, Yield: MAFF 
2004, Concessions: MAFF, Water: CIPS 2004, Health: MoH 2003.  
In the Cambodian context, it is often noted that unforeseen shocks, in particular health 
related ones, are a main contributor to landlessness. Complementary reforms play a 
key role in enabling land reform beneficiaries to cope with future shocks and be able 
to keep possession of their land. Given the devastating effect of health shocks, health 
services are at the top of the list of complementary reforms. Access to credit is 
another important factor for enabling households to develop agricultural activities, 
 24move into alternative employment and withstand shocks. Education will serve to 
improve the ability to effectively use land as well as to facilitate a transition out of 
agriculture. Furthermore, market access through infrastructure improvements can 
increase the value of agricultural surplus and enable diversification of crops and 
create alternative employment opportunities.  
Policies for Equitable Access to Land  
Weak enforcement of ownership rights has made it possible for influential individuals 
and groups to acquire large landholdings for speculative or unproductive purposes. 
This has been done through both through legal and illegal means, including outright 
land grabbing. To achieve a more efficient and equitable land ownership structure, it 
is necessary to address the causes for land ownership concentration.  
Unlawful acquisition of land is essentially a governance problem and should be 
addressed through strengthened land ownership protection. Legal processes for 
revoking unlawfully acquired land should be established. It is clear that influential 
individuals and groups have exploited economic concessions for acquiring large land 
holdings. There is reason to introduce a moratorium on the establishment of new 
economic concessions and existing concessions should be subject to impartial 
scrutiny. Economic concessions that have been established in an unlawful manner 
should be revoked and transformed into social land concessions.  
Even if illegal acquisition of land could be stopped, problems with land ownership 
concentration would likely remain. Land concentration is also driven by the 
vulnerability of poor households to economic shocks, the lack of investment 
opportunities outside real estate, and speculation on future increases in land prices. To 
address land hoarding through legal purchase, other policy alternatives has to be 
considered. To limit distress sales and enable existing owners to keep their land it is 
essential to introduces policies to reduce shocks to vulnerable households. Policies 
for reducing vulnerability include affordable health care, credit programs and 
improvements of agricultural productivity. Land speculation may also be contained by 
improving alternative investment opportunities beside real-estate speculation. This 
involves development of the domestic banking and financial system.  
Taxation is a common policy-instrument for improving socially desirable land use in 
many countries. Theoretically, taxes may be used to achieve a wide variety of policy 
objectives (Brueckner, 2000). Yet, there are many examples of un-successful 
implementation of land taxes in developing countries (Skinner, 1991). Property taxes 
risk undermining the processes that aim to strengthen the legal protection of 
ownership rights. When taxes are levied on ownership of registered property, a 
disincentive for obtaining title is created. When taxes are levied on both titled and 
non-titled land, confusion regarding the exact status of non-titled land will occur. All 
taxes on land may, if not properly structured, be disadvantageous to the poor. In 
extreme cases, levying a tax can increase land concentration as vulnerable households 
are forced to sell land to finance tax payments. In the Cambodian context, any land 
tax high enough to discourage land concentration will run a risk of hurting poor 
households. International experience of progressive land taxes is particularly negative. 
The almost universal failure of progressive taxes on rural land in developing countries 
is due to the political influence of large landowners in rural areas and the formidable 
technical obstacles involved in assessing taxes (Strasma et.al., 1987). These 
 25challenges should be kept in mind when considering taxes as a policy-instrument in 
Cambodia.  
A general land tax with an exception of land holdings below a certain level to 
exclude poor households, would introduce a recurrent cost for those that accumulate 
large land tracts and discourage unproductive holding of land. A land tax could also 
contribute to provincial revenue collection, and decentralization of public service 
delivery. There are also potential problems since a land tax creates incentives for 
evasion, for example through ownership through proxies or by outright bribing of tax 
collectors. Experiences from other developing countries suggest that these problems 
could undo some of the impact on land hoarding.  
Another alternative is a transaction tax on the sale of titled land. This would target 
the purchase rather than the ownership of land and could thus limit speculation by 
introducing a cost of acquiring new assets. A transaction tax can be attractive since it 
does not force distress sales, while it might make selling land to outside investors less 
desirable. To target speculation by outsiders rather than normal transactions, a higher 
tax rate can be levied on transactions with outsiders (compared to close family 
members) and on the sale of recently acquired land. However, this policy also carries 
potential drawbacks. As with other taxes, there will be incentives for evasion, 
potentially creating unregistered shadow transactions and bribing of tax collectors. 
Furthermore, transaction taxes may limit socially desirable transactions and the scope 
for revenue collection is very limited as the tax base is limited.  
Based on these considerations it is clear that; in the short run introducing land 
taxes might not be effective in Cambodia due to capacity constraints and 
institutional weakness. This analysis has highlighted the importance of strengthened 
ownership protection through land-titling and improvements of the legal system –
taxation is not a substitute to improved governance or strengthened legal protection. 
There are substantial risks with introducing a tax before legal institutions has been 
strengthened as a tax might hurt the poor and undermine ongoing land titling. Taxes 
will only be an effective policy when legal protection has reached a sufficient level. 
The introduction of a provincial land tax shall be considered when titling and 
legal ownership protection has been improved. At that point, a general land tax can 
be used both for local revenue collection and for addressing land hoarding. The timing 
for introducing a land tax can be determined on provincial level based on the progress 
of titling and institutional development.  
 26V. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
During the past decade, Cambodia has experienced strong economic growth and a 
good record of poverty alleviation. Yet, progress has been uneven and concentrated to 
a few sectors, such as tourism and garment manufacturing. Growth in the agricultural 
sector has been slow, resulting in an increased concentration of the poor in rural areas.  
There are several reform initiatives aiming to improve the human development 
outcomes of rural households. Based on household survey data, this paper has 
analyzed the potential benefits of agricultural reforms for the poor. Simulations 
indicate large potential human development benefits from land reform. With a full 
reform package, a fall in poverty rates of about 16 percentage points for households 
with prior access to land and almost 30 percentage points for landless households can 
be expected. There is also a notable impact of more limited reform initiatives 
involving distribution of land, with particular benefits accruing to the landless poor.  
The analysis highlights the importance of complementary reforms. Only distributing 
land to landless households has a limited impact on poverty and human development. 
The large gains are realized when increased access to land is combined with 
strengthened ownership rights, investments in land improvement and irrigation, as 
well as complementary reforms in infrastructure.  
There are a number of challenges that have to be met in order to realize these benefits. 
One challenge is to obtain sufficient land and financial resources for the reforms. An 
overview of current land use in Cambodia indicates that at least 15% of the land area, 
or more than 2.1 million hectares, are underutilized could be targeted for land reform. 
This would be sufficient to meet the reform needs of the current rural landless poor.  
Another major challenge is to ensure implementation of reforms. Support and 
cooperation from all levels of government are necessary to implement land reforms. 
Previous reform initiatives have been stalled by insufficient support from either the 
local, provincial, or national levels. In this context, it should be noted that land 
reforms can be an important component for ensuring political and social stability.  
In sequencing reforms, increasing tenure security through the strengthening of legal 
institutions should be at the top of the agenda. Future redistribution of land should be 
based on a dual-income approach, acknowledging the importance of supplementary, 
non-agricultural sources of income. Reforms should be targeted to vulnerable groups, 
whose capabilities to take advantage of the new opportunities should simultaneously 
be strengthened. The complementary reforms needed to achieve this objective include 
public services, in particular health care and education, as well as measures to 
improve market infrastructure.  
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